Crisis

For Antena M by: Miljan Vešović

Yesterday’s Trump-Zelensky meeting was spectacularly unsuccessful, as anyone watching live on TV could see. For starters, it serves as yet another reminder that diplomacy and foreign policy negotiations should take place behind closed doors. There is a reason this has been the norm for centuries.

Regarding the meeting itself, from a moral standpoint, Zelensky is absolutely right. His grasp of the situation on the ground and, more importantly, his understanding of how much Putin’s and Russia’s word is worth (which is nothing) is far closer to reality than Trump’s. That is only natural—Zelensky lives and breathes the war every day, while Trump is thousands of miles away.

Putin and Russia are almost certainly not interested in a lasting peace. For Putin, and the system that created him, confrontation with the West is essential for legitimizing authoritarian rule at home—in other words, for staying in power. And for Putin and his system, nothing is more important than that.

As for Trump, the Ukraine crisis is an inherited problem he has little interest in and wants resolved as quickly as possible so he can focus on other issues. Additionally, some members of his administration, particularly National Security Advisor Waltz, believe it is possible to pull off a “Kissingerian” maneuver—offering Russia concessions to lure it away from its alliance with China, which is seen as the primary threat.

As already explained, this strategy has little chance of success. However, the U.S. can afford to try and make such a mistake. Trump wants to test it, following the example of Clinton, Bush, and Obama, who all, in their own ways, attempted a “reset” with Russia.

The problem, of course, is that the situation today is far more serious than during the Clinton, Bush, or Obama years. Georgia might disagree with this statement, but still, the current Russian aggression against Ukraine is a far greater threat to European security than the 2008 war in Georgia. Ukraine is significantly more critical to Europe’s security than Georgia ever has been.

What Ukraine wants is clear—to be armed to the teeth by the West and to receive near-unconditional support based on shared values. This would either lead to a peace agreement that guarantees Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity (ideally with NATO membership) or a war that ends in victory.

From a values-based perspective, Ukraine’s position is superior. Preventing the legitimization of border changes through force is crucial for European security. However, reality on the ground is different. The opportunity to uphold the principle of territorial integrity was missed in 2014 when the U.S. and Europe made a grave mistake by allowing Russia to annex Crimea without consequences. Much of what we are witnessing today is a direct result of that error. The sanctions currently imposed on Russia (in terms of intensity) should have been introduced back then.

Moreover, while it was always unrealistic to expect Ukraine to achieve more than an honorable draw in a war against Russia, in 2022, there was hope that Ukrainians might exceed expectations. However, the failure of Ukraine’s summer 2023 counteroffensive changed that perception. Russia now holds a serious advantage on the battlefield.

As for Europe, it is behaving as we in the Balkans have long been accustomed to—strong in rhetoric, united, and 100% behind Ukraine on paper. In action? Not so much. Trump knows this, Putin knows this, and so does Zelensky. If it were otherwise, Zelensky wouldn’t be heading to Washington to sign economic agreements after Trump called him a dictator; he would be relying on Europe’s support instead.

Not to mention that many European leaders (and I don’t mean just Orbán and Fico) think about Zelensky and Ukraine much the same way Trump expressed in the Oval Office debate. The difference is that, unlike Trump, they are polite and diplomatic enough not to say it publicly. Additionally, there is no consensus among European allies on what security guarantees to offer Ukraine or whether those guarantees should involve peacekeeping forces.

With the exception of Poland, several Baltic and Scandinavian countries, and (to some extent) France, European militaries are in a dismal state, weakened by decades of underfunding. The situation is so dire that European allies can barely guarantee their own security, let alone Ukraine’s.

This brings us to the current reality—Ukraine and Europe need the U.S., the U.S. under Trump has different priorities (China, domestic politics), and Putin has grown stronger. How to solve this? First, Zelensky must decide what matters more to him—a “moral victory” or Ukraine’s survival. If it’s the latter, he will have to find a way to reconcile with Trump. And with Trump, reconciliation means publicly acknowledging that he is “the strongest guy in the room” and giving him PR victories (a good example is the recent mineral agreement—why this is mostly PR is beyond the scope of this text). This shouldn’t be too difficult.

As for Europe, it is slowly realizing that the era of cheap Russian energy, free security from the U.S., and uninterrupted economic and integration policies is over. Europe now faces a choice—either the social-democratic welfare state and distorted “woke” liberalism or security. Having both is no longer possible.

Additionally, moving away from Keynesian economics and “woke” liberalism while significantly increasing defense spending would easily solidify the transatlantic alliance. It is important to note that, amid all the noise about Ukraine negotiations, all U.S. officials, including Trump, have reaffirmed their commitment to European NATO members’ security and Article 5 of the Washington Treaty—albeit with demands for a fairer burden-sharing arrangement.

All this suggests that the transatlantic alliance is far from over. The deep political and economic interests of both sides, as well as their cultural and ideological proximity, keep it alive. However, at least as long as Trump is in office, the alliance will be more transactional, and Europe will bear a greater burden.

This sheds light on the path ahead for Europe’s allies—significantly increasing defense spending, providing much more serious military support to Ukraine (if they genuinely want Ukraine to win and have guaranteed security), and, in terms of values, rejecting Keynesian economics and the destructive "woke" cultural framework that negatively impacts both the political climate and military readiness. After all, how can one prepare to defend against Russia if they are preoccupied with an imposed and imaginary guilt over events that took place 100 or 200 years ago—such as colonialism?

As for the United States, Trump's and Vance’s public humiliation of Zelensky on camera was, without question, immoral, inconsistent with American values, and, frankly, sickening to watch. However, it is merely one manifestation of the broader political and cultural turmoil within the U.S. It is reasonable to expect that the U.S. will overcome this—because it has faced similar internal upheavals before and has always managed to move past them.

Until that happens, the right approach for America’s allies is one of "strategic patience"—accepting U.S. conditions where possible (while, of course, refusing them where necessary) and waiting for the storm to pass. Zelensky’s mistake last night was failing to grasp this—unlike perhaps less courageous but politically wiser leaders such as Macron and Starmer.

For Montenegro, the key takeaway is clear—the EU, U.S., and UK are our strategic allies. Ukraine is important, but a step below—a friendly nation to which Montenegro has a moral duty to provide as much aid as possible. That means supporting Ukraine diplomatically, advocating for its sovereignty and territorial integrity, and implementing EU sanctions without antagonizing the U.S.

Montenegro must also resist two cultural paradigms that have long hindered its foreign policy—Chetnik ideology and Yugonostalgia. The primary purpose of Montenegrin foreign policy should be to promote and protect its national interest, which means strategic thinking, not hysteria.

Unfortunately, judging by social media reactions, the same mindset that once declared war on Japan over Russia, installed Petar Pešić to dismantle the Montenegrin army for “brotherly Serbia,” burned embassies in Belgrade over Patrice Lumumba, sent telegrams to Brezhnev from Pješivci to leave Czechoslovakia alone, supported terrorists because Josip Broz Tito did the same and asked NATO to bomb Montenegro in solidarity with Serbia still lingers.

Montenegro must leave behind its illusions of grandeur and focus on practical steps—raising defense spending, providing maximum aid to Ukraine, unwaveringly supporting EU policies, and reviving the LNG terminal project in Bar to enhance relations with the U.S.

Above all, diplomacy should not be conducted on Twitter, nor should foreign policy be driven by emotion. Europe’s current situation is arguably the most difficult since 1945. This demands reason, strategic thinking, and a cool head. Emotions should be reserved for love relationships and sports. And for better times, when they come.