The Anatomy of Milorad Dodik’s Hybrid Secessionism

Written by: Sead Turčalo

"The destruction of a state is not always measured by the number of tanks you can deploy, but by the number of court rulings and arrest warrants you refuse to enforce."

One day, historians reflecting on Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2025 may write something like this. Milorad Dodik may not be remembered with the same brutal legacy as convicted war criminals Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadžić. Still, his strategy of hybrid secessionism could prove just as destructive. Instead of besieging cities, Dodik orchestrates bureaucratic blockades of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s institutions. Instead of digging trenches, he builds unconstitutional barriers in Republika Srpska’s parliament.

His institutional manipulations echo those of the early 1990s when the leadership of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), backed by Slobodan Milošević’s regime, declared their own “state within a state.” The consequences then were genocide against Bosniaks, the ethnic cleansing of non-Serb populations, and widespread devastation. Consider also the case of the Republic of Serbian Krajina – a self-proclaimed entity that existed in occupied Croatian territory from 1991 to 1995. Much like the Republika Srpska that Dodik envisions, the Republic of Serbian Krajina survived for years on support from Belgrade, international inaction, and the illusion of sustainability. Dodik has learned this lesson well. He is betting that Europe lacks the strength or the will to intervene, allowing him to act as he pleases – so long as he does so without tanks or fighter jets. This historical precedent is not just a reminder; it is a warning.

Dodik’s methods are more sophisticated than those of Karadžić or Martić. He does not fire bullets – at least not yet – but instead enacts unconstitutional laws. Instead of street barricades, he enforces institutional paralysis. Instead of mortars, he weaponizes the media. The systematic weakening of Bosnia and Herzegovina under his leadership follows a clear pattern: a hybrid strategy of secessionism. Institution by institution, agency by agency, jurisdiction by jurisdiction – he is dismantling the state. The country now exists in a fragile space between peace and conflict, gradually and almost imperceptibly losing control over parts of its territory.

Yet, the real strength of Dodik’s strategy lies in legal manipulation, political blockades, and propaganda. Any state action or political opposition to secessionism is instantly framed as an attack on Serbs. Every court ruling is labeled an act of state repression. The narrative of Serbian victimhood has become a more potent weapon than artillery. This message is further amplified by Serbian media controlled by Aleksandar Vučić. The formula is simple: a population fed on fear will trade reason for obedience.

Another critical factor makes this situation even more dangerous and distinct from previous escalations in Bosnia and Herzegovina: the growing geopolitical instability within the West itself. While, apart from Hungary, the West has almost unanimously condemned Republika Srpska's assault on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s constitutional order, Dodik is betting that, over time, the already fractured transatlantic alliance will become entirely paralyzed. He is counting on a West too consumed by its internal conflicts and dilemmas to confront his challenge to the state. For him, this is an opportunity to cement a de facto state within a state – one that never formally declares independence but operates entirely outside Bosnia and Herzegovina’s authority while still being funded by the very country it seeks to undermine.

Russia and Orbán’s Hungary are eagerly fanning the flames of Dodik’s ambitions. They see the destabilization of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a means to paralyze the EU and NATO in the Balkans. Moscow, in particular, is using Dodik to manufacture another "frozen conflict" in the heart of Europe – akin to Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia. This would further constrain the West, giving Russia a long-term instrument of leverage on Europe’s periphery. Meanwhile, Serbia, under Aleksandar Vučić, plays a duplicitous game. Officially, it affirms Bosnia and Herzegovina’s territorial integrity, yet Vučić’s media outlets fuel nationalism, fostering a climate of crisis and paranoia. At the same time, Serbian officials, including Vučić himself, actively work to undermine Bosnia and Herzegovina’s judiciary.

Ironically, Dodik and his allies frequently invoke Kosovo, arguing that "if Albanians had the right to secede, so must Serbs". However, Kosovo does not support Dodik’s case – it dismantles it. Kosovo’s independence was not the result of institutional subversion but of the brutal war crimes committed by Milošević’s regime against Albanians and the subsequent humanitarian intervention by the international community. It is a sui generis precedent – unique and non-transferable. Dodik has neither the moral standing nor the historical legitimacy to draw parallels with Kosovo. But for Dodik, history is not a matter of principle – it is merely a tool for his present ambitions.

The primary danger of this new form of hybrid secessionism lies in its gradual, incremental nature. It unfolds through cycles of escalation and de-escalation, often with the tacit approval of the international community, which repeatedly underestimates the threat of "silent secession." While the West waits for dramatic moments – like artillery fire or trench warfare – Milorad Dodik carefully operates just below the threshold that would provoke intervention. In doing so, he has created a state of constant instability: severe enough to weaken the country but not catastrophic enough to trigger a decisive response.

But what about domestic actors who oppose the secessionist agenda? Unfortunately, they have been far too slow to act and lack the necessary urgency. Pro-Bosnian political forces remain deeply divided, caught in internal conflicts, and unable to fully comprehend the gravity of the threat facing the state. Rather than adopting a unified strategy or offering clear direction, their responses are often disjointed – reactive, piecemeal, and at times even signaling helplessness. This only erodes public confidence in the resilience of state institutions. What is urgently needed is leadership that can present a clear, compelling narrative of resistance to destabilization and unite various political actors around a shared goal.

At this critical juncture, those resisting the secessionist agenda of the Republika Srpska leadership can no longer afford to indulge in ideological exclusivity or petty party rivalries. This is not a fight for electoral percentages – it is a fight for the preservation of the constitutional order and the state itself.

In this volatile and potentially explosive environment, the shifting political stance of the HDZ BiH deserves close attention. Party leader Dragan Čović has been increasingly distancing himself from Dodik, seemingly calculating that he can capitalize politically on the changing dynamics by forming an alternative coalition that excludes the SNSD. This maneuver, driven by cold political calculation and a realistic understanding of the international climate, could prove to be a pivotal factor in reshaping the political landscape at the state level. However, one key action that would lend this process institutional weight and real momentum – the resignation of Borjana Krišto as Chair of the Council of Ministers, which would automatically trigger the collapse of the entire Council – has yet to materialize.

What is the international community doing? Despite growing warnings, it continues to act as if it has the luxury of time. This is unsurprising, given that for more than two decades, the international community – primarily the European Union – has fostered the illusion that norms, institutions, and conditional integrations can compensate for the absence of real political power. The EU operates under the belief that moral principles can replace force, and that merely promoting values such as the rule of law, multilateralism, and human rights can shape and alter the behavior of actors like Milorad Dodik. This is a fundamental misreading of how power works. Institutions, rules, and norms only matter when there is both the will and the capacity to enforce them. The EU, the broader international community, and domestic political actors must demonstrate that they possess both.

Dodik and leaders like him only change their behavior when faced with real consequences. If the international community wants to prevent a repeat of the 1990s, it must act decisively. EUFOR troops must become more robust, more visible, and more strategically deployed. They need to intensify communication and cooperation with state institutions. Targeted, bilateral sanctions from key EU states against Dodik and his associates must be adopted more swiftly – sanctions that are precise and impactful.

Dodik is betting on the international community’s lack of will and capacity. He is relying on the disunity of what he dismissively refers to as "Sarajevo in the political context". He knows that Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot defend itself unless its pro-sovereignty forces first reach an internal consensus. Every internal dispute among these forces is a gift to his secessionist ambitions. It is time for the responsible actors in Bosnia to rise to the occasion. State institutions must continue to act decisively, the judiciary must uphold the rule of law, and the media and civil society must actively expose the lies spread by the political leaderships of Republika Srpska and Serbia.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is at a defining moment: it must affirm that its statehood is not up for debate, or passively watch as Dodik completes what Milošević and Karadžić failed to achieve 30 years ago. Meanwhile, Europe must ask itself whether it wants another frozen conflict on its periphery – another Abkhazia, another Georgia, or even a new Ukraine on a regional scale.

One undeniable fact remains: Bosnia and Herzegovina’s fate will not be decided by declarations, statements, or diplomatic “processes”. It will be determined by the distribution of power both within and around the country. The current status quo benefits those who seek destruction. Dodik enjoys institutional control over Republika Srpska, backing from Belgrade and Moscow, political cover from Budapest, and passivity from Brussels. His strategy does not require outright secession; he merely needs the state to erode from within, slowly, gradually, day by day.

Everyone must understand that Milorad Dodik is not just a local Bosnian problem. He is the embodiment of the same old threat from the early ’90s, resurfacing once again. This crisis, therefore, can only have two possible outcomes. Either Dodik’s secessionist adventure ends with the legal consequences prescribed for attacks on the constitutional order, or his success sets a precedent, triggering a domino effect with unpredictable consequences. Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Kosovo – all face internal crises, frozen conflicts, and a volatile mix of polarized societies and ambitious leaders.

If we truly want peace, stability, and a future for Bosnia and Herzegovina and the region, the only legacy Dodik should be allowed to leave behind is the punishment for attempting to dismantle the constitutional order of the country he sought to break.