By Miljan Vešović
Another round of negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia, held in Brussels on September 14, ended unsuccessfully. Such a result was expected. For many reasons.
For the autocratic regime of Serbian President Vučić, the success of the negotiations is probably no longer a desirable outcome. If it ever was. If an agreement is reached with Kosovo, Vučić does not gain much. The acceleration of the European integration process, which is the promised reward for the success of the negotiation process, lost its appeal long ago. Partly because it is increasingly visible that there is no political will for enlargement in the EU itself and in certain founding member states. Also, because in Serbia, unlike other countries in the region, there has never been a clear majority of voter support for EU membership.
On the other hand, prolonged duration of the negotiation process without results suits Vučić much more. The fact that he avoids, implicitly or explicitly, to recognize Kosovo, provides him with the continuous support of the nationalist public, the Serbian Orthodox Church and Serbian security apparatus. With a more serious compromise on Kosovo, which the American and European administrations expect from him, Vučić would lose that support. History shows that it is probably impossible to govern Serbia without this kind of support. The last Serbian statesman who (incompletely) attempted this, Zoran Đinđić, was assassinated.
In addition, an unstable region is in the interest of Vučić himself, as well as Serbian security, media, intellectual and mafia structures. Instability opens up opportunities for achieving Serbian nationalist goals.
For Vučić himself, the unresolved issue of Kosovo also leaves the possibility of what the Research Fellow of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies Ivana Stradner defined as "escalate to deescalate" tactics. In practice, this means Vučić retains the possibility to destabilize Kosovo in a controlled manner through parallel structures in the North of the country. Then, through controlled de-escalation, it can extract concessions from the EU and the US.
Milošević-style disinformation about the need to "defend the Serbs in the region from disappearing", which Vučić has been disseminating frequently for the past few weeks, may be an indicator that the Serbian president will once again use that justification to destabilize the situation in the North of Kosovo or elsewhere in the region.
By using delaying tactics and leaving himself the opportunity to cause instability in Kosovo, Vučić is doing a favor to both Russia and China. These two states are revisionist powers that want to fundamentally change the existing rules-based international order. Instability in the Western Balkans is therefore desirable for both Moscow and Beijing. Especially, of course, for the former.
For Putin, the potential that, by “pressing a button” in Belgrade, he can set the region ablaze is of great advantage. The current problem in Serbian – Russian relations - the occasional delivery of Serbian arms to Ukraine, probably pales in comparison.
There is no doubt that the EU (under which auspices the negotiations are held) and the USA are sincerely interested in the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia and general stability in the Western Balkans. For the EU, normalization would mean solving an acute security and political problem in the immediate neighborhood. It would also be a rare foreign policy victory and proof that the Union is capable of acting as a global player.
The United States, in the 1990s, were perhaps the biggest investor (via military, diplomatic and security engagement) in the stability of the Western Balkans. However, US foreign policy focus on the Balkans has decreased in favor of the Middle East (after 9/11), and then the Indo-Pacific, Latin America and Eastern Europe (after Russia's aggression against Ukraine). Achieving a Kosovo-Serbia agreement would be a confirmation of the relevance of the USA in the Western Balkans and the possibility to further reduce engagement in the region, which for decision-makers in the USA is no longer a priority. Western Balkans can then be sorted out by (fast or slow) European integration process.
In addition, the number of American voters of Albanian origin is not negligible, including in swing states, such as Ohio, Michigan or Florida. It is to be expected that the Albanian diaspora in the USA looks favorably on the president during whose term Serbia explicitly or implicitly recognizes Kosovo.
Both the EU and the US, however, are faced with the destabilizing role of Serbia and the increasingly authoritarian Vučić regime in the region. Such a challenge can be answered in three ways. There is no doubt that NATO has more than enough capability to militarily stop any aggressive (open or hybrid) move by Serbia towards its neighbors. However, there is no appetite for new military interventions in the Balkans, neither in the USA nor in the EU. Therefore, such interventions are practically excluded in the near future.
There are two other ways to react to the problem of Serbia. One is a combination of economic and diplomatic pressure (sanctions, reduction of economic cooperation, international isolation, halting of the EU integration process). The second is the policy of appeasement, in the hope that Serbia and Vučić, if they are "satisfied" enough, will turn to the West.
At the moment, the appeasement policy is being used. Probably for several reasons. Both in the EU (and the largest member states) and in Washington, there is fear that the use of a "stick" (as opposed to a carrot) towards Serbia could serve as a justification for Vučić to, with the blessing of Moscow, create a conflict in the Balkans (possibly in Kosovo (North), Bosna and Herzegovina or Montenegro). The conflict could then have to be resolved by military means, which, as already mentioned, is something that the US and the EU want to avoid at all costs.
Another possible reason for a lenient policy towards Serbia is the conviction, still present in certain diplomatic and expert circles in the USA and the EU (more so in the USA), that the pro-Western orientation of Serbia, as the largest country in the region, is worth fighting for and that the possibility of Vučić turning to the West and limiting Russian and Chinese influence still exists.
There is also a cynical reason - that, in a situation of insufficient focus on the region, it is much easier for both the EU and the US to put pressure on an ally (Kosovo) to make concessions, than on a rival (Serbia). As the well-known expert on the Balkans, Daniel Serwer, put it - it is easier to twist the arm of a friend than that of an enemy.
Although the reasons (both cynical and other ones) are convincing, it is clear that the policy of appeasement is not producing results. Specifically in the Serbia – Kosovo negotiations, Vučić refused to sign any document and declared that he would not agree to Kosovo being a member of the UN. This is despite the fact that Kosovo's unhindered membership in international organizations is one of the points of the "Informal Agreement", to which the President of Serbia and the Prime Minister of Kosovo, Kurti, gave verbal consent this spring.
Vučić insists that the Association of Serbian Municipalities (ASM) be established first, which is one of the provisions of the Brussels Agreement from 2013. However, in the interpretation of the Serbian side, the ASM should be an entity similar to the Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is, naturally, unacceptable for Kosovo.
However, it is possible that Kurti's approach to negotiations is too rigid and unconstructive in some situations. This even though there are a lot of things that justify his approach. Kosovo is a country that is much more democratic than Serbia. Unlike Serbia, all Kosovo governments (including Kurti's) are unequivocally pro-Western and committed to the path to NATO and the EU. With moves such as accepting significant number of refugees from Afghanistan, Kosovo made concrete contributions to American foreign policy goals, including in parts of the world that have little to do with Kosovo.
Moreover, with his principled views and firm defense of national interests, Kurti deservedly wins the support of both the domestic public and people in the region who recognize Serbia's aggressive, destabilizing intentions.
Nevertheless, there is a perception, stemming even from the time when Kurti's party "Self-Determination" was in the opposition, that he is a nationalist politician. He is also no stranger to the disruption of the democratic political process (tear gas in the Kosovo Parliament, for example). This perception is reinforced by some of Kurti's positions concerning relations with Serbia. For example, it is not easy to dispute the thesis that the Government of Kosovo had the legitimacy and a clear legal basis to use force at the end of May this year so that the elected mayors of four municipalities in the north of the country could take office.
However, it is questionable how politically useful the action was. Moreover, it can be concluded that the violence that followed was a gift to Vučić. This is because Vučić used the crisis in the North of Kosovo to divert the public's attention from the mass protests he was facing in Serbia and from the scandal that broke out when the New York Times revealed the connection between the Vučić regime and organized crime.
In addition, it is clear why Kurti wants to avoid the formation of anything that can even resemble the "Republika Srpska 2" (ASM) in Kosovo. The problem, however, is that Kosovo assumed that obligation, with the caveat that the ASM must be formed in accordance with the Constitution of Kosovo. It is debatable whether the insistence of the EU and the US that the WTO be the first (or one of the first) items on the negotiation agenda is fair or useful for the success of the process.
However, accusing EU negotiator Lajčak of being "biased", of having "accepted Serbia's position" and concluding that Lajčak is therefore "not needed", which Kurti resorted to after the failure of the latest round of talks, hardly achieves anything, except making the job easier for Vučić himself. Such moves by Kurti enable Vučić to present itself to the EU and the US as a constructive party in the negotiations. On the other hand, Kurti is often perceived as someone who seeks confrontation for the sake of confrontation. All this increases the chances that the policy of appeasement towards Serbia will be considered justified and continue.
The combination, first and foremost, of Vučić's obviously disruptive role in the region and his very questionable motivation for the negotiations to succeed, then of the undoubtedly well-intentioned but methodologically unsuccessful policies of the EU and US and finally of the principled, but perhaps too rigid and sometimes tactically flawed position of Kurti, is the cause of the current impasse in negotiations. It is difficult to expect Vučić to do anything to improve the situation. As explained, he most likely does not want or need the success of the negotiations.
In a situation where there is a strong possibility that one side is sabotaging the negotiations, it is very difficult to expect the process itself to be successfully completed. It is possible, however, to take the necessary measures so that the party sabotaging the process, when it is finished, is unequivocally recognized as the main culprit for the failure. On the part of Kosovo, it is possible to moderate the public appearances of Prime Minister Kurti.
Also, for Kosovo, agreeing to start negotiating about the ASM could be a good tactical move. For two reasons - firstly, because the start of talks does not automatically mean agreeing to everything that Serbia is asking for. Secondly, because the beginning of the discussion about ASO would, to a certain extent, put the ball in Vučić’s court.
As far as the EU and the USA are concerned, accepting the fact that Serbia has already been "carrot-fed" enough and that it is time for a little stick is a riskier, but probably more effective strategy than the one being used now. It is not impossible for such a change to occur – further raising awareness of the danger that Vučić's Serbia represents for the region (including Kosovo) can help facilitate that change. Recent open letter of several US and European lawmakers supporting such position is a step in the right direction.
That is why "strategic patience" is perhaps the only possible strategy for Kosovo in these circumstances. In practice, this means strengthening democratic process and institutions at home as much as possible, acting constructively wherever possible, and waiting for the Western allies to definitively lose their illusions about Serbia.
However, history shows us that the policy of appeasement usually ends only when the appeased party does something that is truly impossible to ignore. It is neither gratifying nor pleasant to speculate on what it could be in the case of Serbia and the region. Nevertheless, it is certainly clear that this would mean seriously negative security and political consequences for the Western Balkans. Therefore, at least in the short term, it is difficult to be optimistic - regarding the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia, but also general security situation in the region.
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