What is next in Ukraine?

By Miljan Vešović

After several months of fighting, the first results of the counter-offensive of the Ukrainian army are visible. Ukrainian forces have, for now, liberated several hundred square kilometers of territory. Also, it seems that the first line of Russian defense has been breached in several places. Ukrainian officials, led by President Zelensky, are still lobbying their Western allies for deliveries of increasingly sophisticated weapons. First of all, they are asking for fighter jets and tactical ballistic missiles.

Nevertheless, the Ukrainian advance is quite slow and, for now, no major areas have been liberated, nor has a decisive breakthrough of the Russian front been reached. Russian defense lines are multiple and well-fortified. Military experts are also of the opinion that the time for more serious offensive operations is running out. The upcoming (autumn and winter) inclement weather suits the side that is on the defensive. For now, it is the Russian Army.

It is possible to conclude that this year's Ukrainian offensive has so far achieved partial, tactical success. However, there is a fine line between partial success and failed expectations.

On the other hand, the first year of aggression against Ukraine was very unsuccessful for Putin and Russia. Nothing materialized from the promised "blitzkrieg" and the fall of Kiev in a few days. The army's performance at the front was extremely poor. Very far from the image, which the Russian regime tried to create, that the Russian army is an equal fighting force to US and NATO.

One of the stated reasons for the Russian attack on Ukraine was the desire to keep NATO as far away from Russian borders as possible. However, NATO is now only about a three-hour drive from Putin's hometown, St. Petersburg. The accession of Finland, which caused such a situation, was a direct consequence of Russian aggression against Ukraine.

Nevertheless, Putin has, in recent times, consolidated his position. The front in Ukraine has somewhat stabilized and the Ukrainian advance has slowed down. At this summer's NATO Summit in Vilnius, Ukraine did not receive firm guarantees that it would receive an invitation for membership in the Alliance. Instead, the country was told that it would be invited "when the Allies agree and conditions are met." On the domestic front in Russia, with Prigozhin’s assassination, Putin showed "who's the boss" and cemented his hold on power.

The time also probably works for Russia. That is the card Putin continues to play. It is not realistic to expect that the protracted war and failures on the front can significantly shake him. This is because Putin's regime is authoritarian, with almost complete control of the media space, the propaganda machine and information flows. In addition, throughout history, Russia usually won wars only after exhausting, long fighting, and great sacrifices. That is why the threshold of tolerance for war suffering in Russian society is higher.

There are three ways in which the situation can develop further. A complete Russian victory and occupation of all or major parts of Ukraine are, at least in the short term, almost impossible. The fighting capacity, morale and courage of the Ukrainian defenders are too strong for such a thing, and the Russian forces in Ukraine are too weakened. Two scenarios remain - one is the Ukrainian victory and the liberation of the occupied territories (with or without Crimea).

The second, which at this moment seems most likely, is some kind of stalemate - a long-lasting, exhausting war in which neither side can achieve significant short or mid-term successes.

If such a situation develops, Ukraine and its Western allies (including, of course, Montenegro as a member of NATO) will face a dilemma. One way to react to such a development is to enter into negotiations with Russia and make peace. The advantages of such a scenario are that Ukraine preserves its independence, war suffering and destruction are stopped, tensions with Russia are de-escalated and the danger of a nuclear war is reduced. For Western allies, the need to spend large sums of money for military and other aid to Ukraine ends.

This solution, however, has a flaw that is very difficult to ignore. Namely, it is not realistic to expect that Russia will agree to a peace that does not include the legitimization of the annexation of Crimea and other occupied territories. Therefore, seizing foreign territories by force would again become an acceptable thing to do in international relations. That would be a blow from which the existing rules-based international order would have a hard time recovering. It would also be an important victory for Russia and China, which want to fundamentally change or destroy the above - mentioned order.

There is also another way of reaction – acceptance of Western allies that the war will be long-lasting and the continuation of providing military and other aid to Ukraine until the final victory, however long it takes. In addition to that, giving much firmer guarantees to Ukraine that, after the end of the war, it will join NATO.

This is undoubtedly the morally correct path, and most likely politically and strategically advantageous one as well.

However, even that path is not without serious obstacles. First of all, one cannot be sure that Ukraine will succeed in liberating the entire territory, even with the continuous support of the Western allies. Also, the USA and the largest members of NATO and the EU have already spent hundreds of billions of dollars for military, financial and humanitarian aid to Ukraine. The question is how realistic and even possible it is to expect from politicians and voters in those countries to have the patience to rubber-stamp such spending for years.

And last but not least, the possibility that Russia, if faced with total defeat, will use tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine is improbable, but cannot be ruled out. Therefore, a way of reacting to such a scenario must be found - and that is not easy.

Therefore, there are no easy solutions for the situation in Ukraine. Perhaps it can be concluded that this (at least for the West) is primarily a consequence of the wrong, too lenient and lukewarm policy towards Putin's Russia that lasted decades before the attack on Ukraine. Putin's regime has been authoritarian since the middle of the first decade of the 21st century - for almost 20 years. The attack on Georgia in 2008, the support for the Assad regime in Syria, the annexation of Crimea and the provoking of the war in Donbass in 2014, the hybrid war that has been waged against NATO, the EU and the USA for years - these were all alarm bells, but also missed opportunities for more decisive action by the Western allies.

Of course, hindsight is always 20/20. Nevertheless, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that a stronger, more resolute reaction to Putin's previous acts of aggression might have succeeded in deterring him from causing the biggest war on the European continent since 1945. Therefore, the lesson of the Ukrainian crisis is that authoritarian states sooner or later come into conflict with democratic ones, and "reset” and “soft approach” towards them make them more, not less aggressive.

It would not be bad if the EU, NATO and the USA applied that lesson to the Western Balkans as well. It is also not too bad for Montenegrin politicians to learn it, whoever of them is in power.