The Church problem

By Miljan Vešović

A few days ago, Antena M published an interesting short statement by a former member of the Croatian security services, Željko Kekić. Kekić described the cases when weapons caches were found in the monasteries of the Serbian Orthodox Church (hereinafter SOC) in Croatia. According to Kekić, the last such case happened in 2022. Croatia has been a member of NATO since 2009, and the EU since 2013.

A few years ago, the media in Montenegro published transcripts of communications between members of organized criminal groups. The transcripts became public when EUROPOL penetrated the Sky phone app, which was used by mobsters for secret conversations. In one of those conversations, one of the members of the mafia in Montenegro, a certain Knežević, explains to the interlocutor that the SOC requested the purchase of 100 AK47 automatic rifles. The rifles were supposed to serve for the organization of an armed rebellion, in the event that the result of the elections in Montenegro in 2020 was not to the SOC's liking.

The aforementioned Knežević received the request for weapons from his brother, Ostoja Knežević, who is a high-ranking priest of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Montenegro.

The pro-Western Montenegrin media have also written about SOC priest Mijajlo Backović several times. Backović is a former member of the special forces of the Serbian army. He is known to the public for propagating militant Serbian and Russian nationalism, but also for hanging out with people from the criminal milieu as well as (interestingly for a conservative Orthodox priest) with Playboy models.

What is much more important - he is one of the main organizers of paramilitary formations in Montenegro, the so-called "Orthodox brotherhoods". Those organizations are connected to the Russian Cossacks and the "Night Wolves". There are serious indications that active duty and retired officers of the Russian military forces and/or security services have participated in the establishment and day to day activities of those "Orthodox brotherhoods".

It is known that the SOC is very involved in political processes in Montenegro. After the elections on August 30, 2020, that church organized a meeting of political parties favorable to it in order to agree on the formation of a government. A few weeks ago, the SOC cleric responsible for that area tried to interfere in the election of the director of the Coal Mine in Pljevlja.

Priests of the Serbian Orthodox Church are active in pro-Russian and anti-Western propaganda. In their interpretation, NATO is a "satanic creation", Montenegro is "Ukraine in miniature", and prayers are regularly organized for the success of the Russian army in Ukraine.

It is useful to be reminded here that Montenegro has been a member of NATO since 2017, and is still one of the most serious candidates for EU membership.

Therefore, it is not surprising to those in the know that the recently destroyed terrorist cell in the North of Kosovo used the SOC monastery as a shelter and hiding place for weapons. It certainly did not surprise the former SACEUR, General Wesley Clark, who pointed to "earlier cases when Serbian Orthodox Church monasteries were used as arsenals of weapons and ammunition."

It probably did not surprise members of European Parliament either, which adopted the resolution stating that "Russia is using its influence in Serbia in an attempt to destabilize and interfere in neighboring sovereign states: in Bosnia via the Republika Srpska; in Montenegro via the country’s pro-Serbian sentiments as well as the Serbian Orthodox Church; and in Kosovo by exploiting and inflaming existing disputes in the North of Kosovo".

All this indicates that the role of the SOC as one of the key agents of Serbian nationalism and Russian influence in the Balkans is quite clear. That church had been preparing for such a role for a long time, even theologically. "Traditional" Orthodoxy, as a type of Christianity professed by other Orthodox churches, was supplemented by the so-called "Svetosavlje" (after St. Sava, a medieval Serbian saint). Svetosavlje, which was founded in the middle of the 20th century by the Serbian priest and theologian Justin Popović, and which was "perfected" in the wars of the 1990s, is a combination of religion, aggressive Serbian nationalism and rejection of (regardless whether liberal or conservative) Western values.

That is why the support of the SOC to anti-Western and pro-Russian political forces in the Western Balkans is logical. Just as it is logical that the political forces in the countries of the region, which cooperate with the SOC in order to come to power, are either anti-Western/pro-Russian from the beginning, or end up being that.

The question, however, is how to react to this situation. The reality is that in limiting the influence of the SOC it is not possible to apply the same means as in limiting other agents of Russian/Serbian and anti-Western influence. Religious freedom and a tolerant attitude towards religious communities are one of the key European and Euro-Atlantic values. Former communist countries in particular are expected to treat these issues with great sensitivity.

An instructive example is the adoption of the Law on Freedom of Religion in Montenegro in 2019. Driven by the real need to correct historical injustice, but also to limit the influence of the SOC as an agent of pro-Russian and anti-state influence in Montenegro, the parliamentary majority at the time adopted a law regulating the issue of church property in Montenegro. Unfortunately, that move was not met with great understanding by European and trans-Atlantic allies. One of the reasons for this is the perception created (and encouraged by the SOC and Serbia through the spread of fake news) that religious freedoms have been threatened.

Ukraine faced a similar problem. This country, after the Russian aggression in 2022, banned the activities of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine. That decision was also not understood by parts of public in the USA and European countries. Precisely, because of the possible violation of religious freedoms.

What can be done is to try to find the reasons why, specifically in Montenegro, the SOC is so popular. This despite the fact that the majority of the electorate supports membership in NATO, and almost 80% support membership in the EU. However, according to polls, the institution in which the Montenegrin electorate has the most confidence is the SOC. One of the reasons for this may be the impression that the Church, unlike political leaders, as the "House of God", is unsullied by corruption and other scandals.

That is why advocating and fighting for the eradication of corruption to the greatest extent possible is important in this area as well. It restores trust in state institutions, but also in pro-Western political parties.

Also, it is noticeable that the support and trust in the SOC are the highest in the areas that are the least economically developed. These are rural areas/small towns where lack of economic and infrastructural development sometimes makes families dependent on someone else's support. SOC is often there to provide that support. Therefore, a strong push to encourage economic development in those areas can help pro-Western forces regain confidence. Urban elites sometimes need to be reminded that people living in rural areas and small towns should be treated with respect, not disdain, and that these people deserve the same opportunity to lead a dignified life that is available in urban areas.

In addition, it wouldn’t be bad to show greater determination in situations when the SOC (or anyone else) denies to the state of Montenegro, or to the Montenegrin nation, the right to exist, or the historical fact of the autocephaly of the Orthodox Church in Montenegro. There is a long way to go to restore that autocephaly. However, the renewed actualization of that issue can only be useful.

As for the Western allies, it has already been explained that their sensibility regarding religious freedoms requires them to be particularly cautious when it comes to their treatment of the SOC. That is probably not something they should be blamed for. However, it is probably necessary, and not impossible, to do more. Tactically, it is possible to separate the SOC as a religious community and the individuals in the SOC who are the most prominent agents of malign Russian and Serbian influence.

Putting clerics for whom there is evidence of involvement in Russian/Serbian intelligence operations or mafia activities under sanction regime or simply “naming and shaming” them can be a particularly effective tool. This will send a clear message to the SOC that they are not untouchable.

Also, the public in the region has great confidence in the Western allies when it comes to the fight against (any kind of) corruption, crime or illegal activities. When Western countries put someone on the sanctions list sanctions, or mark them as mob associates, it has a much greater effect than when the authorities of the countries of the region do it. This is because trust in the political impartiality of the West is greater.

Therefore, the collection of strong evidence, followed by an adequate reaction, about the involvement of individuals from the SOC in “nefarious activities" can shed light on the "un-Christian" behavior of high-ranking members of this religious community to voters (including churchgoers). This can further cause a decline in public trust in the SOC, and thus reduce the penetration of the pro-Russian and anti-Western attitudes that the SOC disseminates.

Otherwise, the lack of an adequate internal and external reaction to the activities of the SOC can make the contamination of the political, social and cultural space, and consequently the security problem for both the region and NATO, caused by SOC, irreversible and almost impossible to fix.