By Miljan Vešović
Last week, the European Commission presented annual progress reports for countries that are candidates and aspirants for membership.
Ukraine and Moldova received recommendations for opening accession negotiations. Bosnia and Herzegovina received a "conditional" recommendation - accession negotiations will begin when that country "reaches the necessary level of compliance with membership criteria". Georgia received a recommendation to become a candidate for membership (a step before the opening of accession negotiations).
As for the other candidates, here a very concise and precise presentation by Montenegrin daily "Pobjeda": "Turkey started accession negotiations in 2005 and the negotiations are at a dead end; the negotiations of Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia are also at a standstill". The European Commission called on Kosovo and Serbia to "engage more constructively" in the dialogue on the normalization of relations. In addition, it expressed concern that Serbia had not yet introduced sanctions against Russia.
As for Montenegro, compliance with the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU was given good marks, which was also the case in previous reports. In other areas, the evaluations are mostly negative. Among other things, it was stated that there was no progress in the reform of the judiciary, and that progress in the fight against corruption was limited. It was also underlined that the political system was "blocked", which was brought about by "politicians who were ready to ignite a constitutional crisis in order to achieve short-term party gains". It was emphasized that the Government (under the leadership of D. Abazović) "continued to make important decisions and to fire and appoint public officials" even though it was in a technical mandate.
The dynamics of harmonization with the EU acquis, it is concluded, "is taking place more slowly than was expected"
It can be said that it is probably clear to anyone who follows the situation in the Western Balkans and Montenegro that the assessments of the European Commission are mostly correct. The reports, however, like most of the previous ones, are important not because of the things that are there, but because of the things that are missing.
First of all, the reports reduce the EU enlargement process to the Western Balkans to a technical aspect. In theory, a country's progress is measured by how quickly it "closes" (reaches EU standards) negotiation chapters. When the chapter is closed, it means that the country is ready to be included in the EU system in that area. However, being "ready" (when a country closes all chapters) does not mean being a member. Admission of new members depends, first of all, on the political will of existing members. Enlargement is therefore first and foremost a political process.
Brussels officials continue to publicly express their support and commitment to the enlargement process. In practice, however, the EU has not received new members for 10 years. Some of the largest members, primarily France, do not hide their skepticism towards enlargement. Official France believes that admission of new members is possible "only when the internal reforms in the EU are completed". Reform processes in the EU usually take decades.
In an exhaustive analysis of the political situation in Montenegro published by the Croatian historian T. Jakovina for the "Analitika" portal, the author quoted an unnamed EU diplomat who commented on the accession negotiations of the candidate countries and the EU as follows: "they (candidates) are pretending to carry out reforms, and we are pretending to enlarge". The conclusion can be drawn from this that the root of the stagnation in the enlargement process is the lack of political will of some EU member states to make it happen.
When politicians in the Western Balkans are aware that there is no enlargement, or that they have to wait too long, then they are less willing to carry out reforms. This is because those reforms may result in the destabilization of their political positions. If they know that after the successful implementation of those reforms, the country they lead will join the EU, the risk will probably pay off - that's why the reforms are happening. If there is no entry into the EU, the risk is not worth it.
By demonstrating the lack of political will to expand the EU to the Western Balkans, the member states are making a strategic mistake. It is not just that the lack of European integration opens up space for Russian and Chinese influence. It is about the fact that the membership of the countries of the region in the EU is the only way to stabilize the Western Balkans in the long term.
Namely, one of the key reasons for almost all previous instabilities in the Western Balkans was aggressive nationalism. First of all, Serbian, and to a lesser extent Croatian and Albanian. Aggressive nationalisms use and abuse the fact that large parts of Serbian, Croatian and Albanian ethnicities live outside their home country. These are Serbs in BiH, Kosovo and Montenegro, Croats in BiH and Montenegro and Albanians in Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro.
Serbian nationalism, as is well known, uses this fact as a justification for aggressive actions towards its neighbors. The slogan "All Serbs in one state" was replaced by the concept "Serbian world". The essence, however, remains the same - the factual or formal unification of Serbia with all territories where ethnic Serbs live.
If all the countries of the region were to join the EU, the basic purpose of Serbian nationalism would also disappear. All Serbs (Croats, Albanians...) might not formally live in one state. However, the common market and the free flow of people, goods and capital in the EU would make them feel that way.
In addition, the EU, as a community of values and not only a political and economic community, would be an excellent framework for the peaceful resolution of all remaining regional disputes. This is also the key advantage of European integrations compared to integrations that are limited only to the region (like the "Open Balkan" project). The codified supranational structure of the EU, decision-making by consensus and the other member states would be the guarantors that in any regional dispute no Western Balkan country would be able to achieve supremacy through coercive means.
The stagnation in EU integration, however, makes a stable vision of the Western Balkans unattainable for the time being. The EU, however, still insists on the "technicality" of the integration process, and some leaders such as French President Macron are still skeptical. Why?
Part of the problem may be a lack of strategic vision. This claim is enhanced by the behavior of the EU in the Kosovo-Serbia negotiations, more specifically the lack of serious diplomatic pressure on EU members who have not recognized Kosovo to do so. The EU's approach to negotiations boils down (roughly speaking) to the following - the rapid formation of the Union of Serbian Municipalities in exchange for Serbia's implicit recognition of Kosovo. At the same time, the euphemism for implicit recognition is "that Serbia is not opposed to Kosovo's membership in international organizations".
However, if Kosovo cannot even in the long run enter the EU because there are EU members who do not recognize it, it cannot enter NATO for the same reason, and it cannot enter the UN because Russia can veto the membership recommendation in the Security Council - the question arises what exactly Kosovo gets in return for being cooperative in negotiations.
Macron's tough stance on EU enlargement, combined with other moves by the French president, raises doubts that it is not about a lack of strategic vision. It is possible that his strategic vision for Europe is markedly different from the one propagated by other Western leaders, NATO and EU officials.
Macron is the statesman who called NATO "brain dead". He has long been an advocate of a "soft" approach to the Putin regime. Even after the aggression against Ukraine, he publicly declared that "Putin should not be humiliated" and that Russia “deserves security guarantees". There are reports that France is significantly reducing military aid to Ukraine - according to current data, France sent less military aid to Ukraine than Lithuania - even though France is a country several dozen times larger in terms of territory and population.
Beyond Ukraine, Macron has also repeatedly made statements harmful to transatlantic unity. He was the first of the major Western allies to publicly call for a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. Last April, he visited China. On that occasion, he stated that "Europe is at great risk of being involved in crises that do not concern Europe" (referring to the relations between China and the USA). He openly stated that "the worst thing Europeans can do regarding Taiwan is to just follow the American agenda."
Macron is also, together with certain German politicians (usually Social Democrats who have historically been advocates of a "soft approach" towards the Soviet Union/Russia), and leaders such as the President of Brazil Lula Da Silva or Putin himself, a proponent of the "multipolar world" thesis.
According to this view, the rise of Russia, China, India and Brazil has made the world multipolar again. That is why Europe (in Macron's vision, led by France) should achieve "strategic autonomy". In practice, this means ending reliance only on the US through the transatlantic alliance and establishing cooperation with other great powers.
There are however several problems with this “multipolarity” claim. First, it is factually incorrect - the USA is still the world's only superpower. China is trying to reach that status, but it is still far away - and countries like Russia, India or Brazil are even further.
Secondly, this logic can serve as an alibi for a soft attitude towards Russia. Ukraine would, of course, pay the highest price for that. However, it is possible that the Western Balkans is already paying the price. It is possible that the French (at least for now) "no" to EU enlargement to the region is actually a long-term concession to Russia. In that case, Russia would have a free hand to strengthen its influence in the Balkans. Unlike official Brussels, Berlin and Washington, Macron's moves suggest that Paris now sees the Western Balkans as a space for competition between Europe and Russia (and China), rather than as part of a united Europe.
If we continue to follow this logic, it is no coincidence that, of all the EU countries, France is currently the most lenient one towards the destabilizing moves of the Vučić regime in Serbia. France is also strengthening economic cooperation with Serbia. Serbia, naturally, is a country that likes the EU enlargement “freeze” the most. Such a situation allows Vučić, on the one hand, to avoid democratic reforms which, as an autocrat, he does not want to implement. On the other hand, the stagnation in enlargement, as already explained, creates exactly the kind of regional instability that aggressive Serbian nationalism needs to achieve its goals.
Of course, everything mentioned in the previous few paragraphs are possibilities, not confirmed facts. However, the fact is that the medium-term perspective of the membership of the Western Balkan countries in the EU is, to say the least, doubtful. In that situation, the question arises what Montenegro, as a country that has progressed furthest in accession negotiations with the EU, and also as a country that is directly under the attack of Serbian and Russian malign influence, should do. In particular, what should the political forces that support the pro-European and pro-Euro-Atlantic agenda stand for.
A three-fold recommendation can be made. First of all, establishing a political and social consensus as quickly as possible for the completion of reforms, intensifying the fight against corruption and organized crime and fulfilling the criteria for EU accession. Regardless of the policy of individual members, if Montenegro quickly becomes ready for membership, it cannot be to its detriment.
On the other hand, it is probably useful to make efforts to comprehensively strengthen and deepen alliances and partnerships with Western countries that are not members of the EU - primarily the USA and the United Kingdom. There are many ways to do this - from attracting investments and intensifying cultural/educational exchange, through strengthening defense cooperation (including future purchases of military equipment) to deepening cooperation in multilateral diplomacy (there are a large number of initiatives and candidacies in international organizations where support and vote of Montenegro can be significant).
Also, it is advisable to strengthen cooperation with our regional allies - in the first place, Croatia and Albania. We border those two countries, we are connected by the Adriatic Sea, as well as through NATO. Initiatives aimed at promoting political, economic and security cooperation between these three countries already exist, but they have been neglected. It is not a bad idea to try to reactivate them - especially now that Albania is no longer an ardent supporter of the "Open Balkan". The Montenegro - Croatia - Albania cooperation can be both a limiting factor for malign Serbian influence in Montenegro itself, and a counterbalance to it in the region.
Of course, the extent to which these recommendations are achievable in the short term, having in mind that the Speaker of the Montenegrin Parliament is a person that has been convicted in the first instance for Russia – sponsored terrorism, is very questionable. We hope, however, that they can be a landmark for civil, pro-European forces in Montenegro in formulating foreign policy strategy and courses of action.
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