Christmas in the Balkans – Not Exactly Merry This Year

Miljan Vešović

 Elections in Serbia will be held on Sunday, December 17th. Barring “The Miracle on Ice” type surprise, Aleksandar Vucic and his Serbian Progressive Party will win and have a chance to form yet another government.

Serbian opposition’s chances to win majority are close to zero. They stand somewhat better in the Serbian capital, Belgrade, where Vucic’s popularity is not as high as is in the rest of the country. However, possible defeat in Belgrade would only “slightly wound” Vucic. His firm grip on all state institutions, as well as almost total control of security apparatus and media will stay untouched.

While an upset opposition win in Serbia would mean a lot for democracy, it wouldn’t change much when it comes to the security of the Western Balkans. The main opposition bloc’s foreign policy platform is almost a carbon – copy of Vucic’s – it rejects the independence of Kosovo, refuses to condemn Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and introduce sanctions to Russia. Other opposition parties are going even further – they openly support Russia and call for end of Serbia’s accession negotiations with EU.

The point is – whoever wins, Serbia will remain hostile to Western interests in the region and Europe, a main source of instability and the closest political and economic partner of Russia and China.

The Western efforts to counter Serbian (and by extension, Russian and Chinese) malign influence in the Western Balkans have so far been insufficient and inadequate. In US, there is a certain disinterest in the region – the focus is elsewhere, on wars in Israel and Ukraine and in Indo – Pacific. In order to somehow reconcile that disinterest with genuine wish and necessity to keep Western Balkans stable, the State Department planners devised a strategy to keep Vucic happy (and consequently the region stable) by turning a blind eye to Serbia’s cooperation with Xi and Putin and its attempts to destabilize Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro.

Biden’s administration is calculating that by letting “small” destabilizations be, they can avoid a larger one.

On the other hand, European Union has for the last 20 years tried to “speak softly and carry a big carrot” in the Balkans. However, the carrot – enlargement, is currently not available and will not be for the foreseeable future. Therefore, EU devised their own version of appeasing Vucic – by twisting Kosovo’s arm to make concessions to Serbia in negotiations while not getting anything tangible in return.

The terrorist attack in North of Kosovo on September 24th, orchestrated by Serbian intelligence services with possible help of Russia, was an opportunity for EU and US to stop the appeasement and take firmer position towards Serbia. However, Vucic was allowed to escape with verbal warnings and promises not to be a bad boy again.

Deterioration of political and security situation is visible elsewhere too. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republika Srpska and its pro-Russian leader, Dodik, are increasingly vocal in their requests to secede. By obstruction of federal institutions from within, Dodik managed to turn Bosnia and Herzegovina into an ungovernable failed state long ago. Now he feels emboldened to raise the stakes and openly advocate for secession, which, if happens, will almost certainly lead to new civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In Montenegro, Minister of Justice gave an interview yesterday and publicly admitted that under previous (pro-Serbian) government, Montenegro’s intelligence service was a mere “satellite office of security services that function outside of NATO system” (read Serbia). This statement is even more remarkable considering that said Minister of Justice, Milovic, started his career as a staunchly pro-Serbian and pro-Russian politician. However, Milovic, who’s traversed a similar political path to his ally, Prime Minister of Montenegro Spajic, now, when he is in power, can see with his own eyes that Russian/Serbian malign influence has destroyed Montenegro’s security apparatus and has made the countryextremely politically unstable.

It is very uncertain whether politicians such as Milovic and Spajic, or the unquestionably pro-Euro Atlantic opposition in Montenegro, have the wherewithal to keep Montenegro in Western orbit. As repeated many times –politicians such as President of Montenegro, Milatovic and Speaker of the Parliament, Mandic, are firm allies of Vucic (and by extension Putin). It is an open question whether pro-Western MPs have the majority in Montenegrin Parliament, even if such forces from ruling coalition and opposition are combined.

Even in a hypothetical scenario where pro-Serbian and pro-Russian elements are booted out from government, Vucic can, and will, still use Serbian Orthodox Church and Serbia’s intelligence networks (that have been largely left unchecked in Montenegro for the last three years) to create instability and chaos in Montenegro.

The situation in Kosovo, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia clearly shows that Western approach to the Balkans in the last five years has not been successful. However, there aren’t muchhope that the course will be changed, at least in the short term. As said before, Biden’s administration is preoccupied with other crises. Moreover, they are still hoping that Vucic will, after winning the election, will make good on his promise to (implicitly) recognize Kosovo.

It is true that the time is limited – Biden wants the Kosovo issue wrapped up before the US presidential elections, so that he can make good on his promise to Albanian diaspora in the US that Kosovo will gain recognition during Biden’s first term. Consequently, Vucic will probably be given time till the spring/summer to deliver on Kosovo.

As for the EU, they have a clear path towards finally solving the Balkans conundrum – acceleration of enlargement process, revitalization of “regatta principle” (each country accedes to EU as soon as it fulfills conditions, as opposed to candidate countries waiting for one another and joining EU in groups) combined with firm requests to countries to implement reforms, promote Western values and root out (as much as possible) corruption, organized crime and malign influence by Russia, China or Serbia.

 In Kosovo, recognition from 5 EU member states that still haven’t done that and clear support for Kosovo’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and nascent democracy, combined with finally showing stick to Serbia, can embolden pro-European forces in Kosovo, neighboring countries and ultimately Serbia as well.

However, there are currently no indications that EU will take that course. There is a simple reason for that –in order for it to succeed, enlargement process would have to be unfrozen. Some of the member states, first and foremost France, want, however, the enlargement to still be stuck.

Vucic and Putin will, therefore, see 2024. as an opportunity to consolidate and expand their gains in the region. There are already indications that Vucic will, after winning the elections, delay the formation of new government as long as possible. This is precisely to avoid keeping the promise to implicitly recognize Kosovo.

Vucic is also hoping for a Trump win in USA – not because he likes Trump’s policies (after all, Trump’s toughness on China and his willingness to “kick butt” when things don’t go his way cannot possibly make Vucic comfortable), but because he hopes to use the profound (cynics would say corrupt) influence he has on former intelligence czar in Trump’s administration, Richard Grenell, who is unfortunately still a respected figure in the MAGA movement.

Nevertheless, whoever wins in USA, Vucic’s strategy will remain the same –diverting US attention from the region by giving false promises that only he can keep it stable. Once the US attention is (or remains) diverted –Vucic will do his utmost to keep Balkans unstable and help Putin.

Of course, Vucic’s and Putin’s gains are losses for everyone else. The biggest loser might be the stability of the region, which in 2024 will probably be even more eroded. It seems that an open conflict somewhere in the Western Balkans would be the only thing that can focus minds in the region and in the West. The idea that the region might soon be forced to choose between accepting Serbian (Russian and Chinese) domination or experiencing an armed conflict again shows how dire the situation has become.

Christmas and New Year’s holidays are the season of joy and hope. There aren’t, unfortunately, much of those left in the Western Balkans.