How does a civil conflict in Montenegro start?

For Antena M by: Miljan Vešović 

When Russian President Putin and Serbian President Vucic finally decide to act on their plans to seriously destabilize a NATO ally, Montenegro, and start another conflict in the Western Balkans, they will need only a couple of months to do it. Here is how.

Firstly, the Government of Montenegro is weak, unstable and completely dependent on support of extreme pro-Serbian and pro-Russian parties. These pro-Serbian and pro-Russian elements are already loudly requesting the so-called “reconstruction” of Government – which means handing them ministerial posts. Speaker of Montenegrin Parliament, Andrija Mandic, is one of the most prominent pro-Russian politicians in the country – meaning Vucic’s and Putin’s supporters control the Parliament agenda as well.

They have tacit support from another pro-Serbian politician – President of Montenegro Milatovic, as well as from some members of opposition (former PM Abazovic and his party) and, most importantly, from Serbian Orthodox Church, which has, for the last 3.5 years, been by far the most influential entity in Montenegro.

All this means, that pro-Serbian/pro-Russian block is currently the most powerful political force in Montenegro. Once their most extreme elements enter the Government, they will be in position to destabilize it from within. They already control the security sector – according to the current Minister of Justice of Montenegro, Montenegro’s premier intelligence service, ANB, was reduced to being “a satellite office of security services that function outside of NATO system” (read: Serbian intelligence service BIA).

However, the pro-Serbian elements in ruling coalition have so far successfully blocked the expected personnel changes in ANB. That means that same people who controlled Montenegro’s intelligence then control it now. That further means, that Montenegro’s intelligence service is still “a satellite office” of Serbian BIA.

Moreover, Montenegro basically doesn’t have a functioning border with Republika Srpska, which is, together with Serbia, the main Russian proxy in the Western Balkans. According to investigative reporting of Montenegrin daily “Pobjeda”, the previous, openly pro-Vucic government basically destroyed the functionality of Montenegro’s Border Patrol, by deliberately sidelining seasoned border policemen and installing incompetent party loyalists instead.

The other ministers in Montenegrin Government, led by Prime Minister Spajic, have so far buried their heads in the sand and chosen to ignore all this. Instead, they are, at least publicly, trying to concentrate on economic issues and European integration process. However, it is hard to believe that they do not understand that the fact that an authoritarian president of a hostile country has the power to topple their government quickly does not bode well for their political careers. It is also naïve to the extreme to think that Vucic will just let Montenegro conclude the accession negotiations with EU before Serbia does (and Serbia doesn’t have the intention to conclude these negotiations at all).  And yet, so far, they haven’t shown the political courage and acumen to face and respond to the threat.

In this situation, it is relatively easy to stoke civil conflict in Montenegro. First, the pro-Russian and pro-Serbian parties topple the Government. They can either do it “from within” – by using the ministerial posts they get in “reconstruction” to block the decision-making process or they can simply demand more ministerial posts than before and use the rejection of that demand as an excuse to vote the Government out of power.

Once Montenegro is again saddled with a “caretaker” government, the President can either give a mandate to a political party to form a new government, or call a snap election. Whichever the case, the ensuing political instability will be a good opportunity for pro-Serbian and pro-Russian forces to again start propaganda that the “Serbs in Montenegro are in danger”, that “Montenegrin nationalists will be back in power soon” and that Montenegro is too dysfunctional and unstable to exist as a state at all.

Then the real chaos starts – municipalities such as Pljevlja, Niksic and Berane, where pro-Serbian/pro-Russian parties have clear majorities and where influence of the Serbian Orthodox Church is strongest, may proceed to organize sham “referenda” and secede from Montenegro. The population in these municipalities has been actively prepared for this for long time – by disregard of their mayors for Montenegrin flag, national anthem and Montenegrin institutions and legal system and by organization of events such as “Saint Sava Ball” and other open displays of aggressive, virulent Serbian nationalism.

The possible opposition to secession can further be discouraged by the intervention of the Serbian Orthodox Church, who can present the process as an “historic opportunity for Serbs to unite” and more importantly, as God’s wish.

Just like 10 years ago in Crimea and Donbass, the secessionists will be actively helped by paramilitary forces trained by Russian and Serbian intelligence services and inserted to Montenegro via the porous border. These armed elements will be tasked to exercise control over municipal institutions or stop any attempt by Montenegrin security forces or Montenegrin patriots to interfere with the “referenda”.

How can Montenegro state institutions react to this? If they are paralyzed, they cannot do it effectively. Pro-Russian and pro-Serbian elements can use their control of intelligence and security apparatus to block/delay effective official reaction. Mandic can block the Parliament from declaring martial law and, as member of Security and Defense Council, which is the institution that holds command of Armed Forces of Montenegro and needs unanimous vote to make a decision, he can stop Montenegro’s military from reacting. The Parliament Speaker can also decline to give a vote to a possible bill to trigger Article 4 and/or 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty – Montenegro will then be unable to compel NATO to act.

And now the finale – Vucic can start threatening military intervention, because “Serbs are in danger” from the ensuing conflict. He can use this threat as a leverage to either asks for constitutional changes and federalization of Montenegro (by using his “escalate to de-escalate tactics to blackmail the West) or he can officially stand aside (Montenegro is, after all, a NATO ally), but further stoke the conflict by arming the secessionists and inserting more paramilitaries. Whichever option he chooses, he (and Putin, of course) will count on the fact that the West will be too preoccupied with crises in Ukraine and Middle East and elections in EU, UK and US. Especially if Montenegro itself doesn’t trigger the Article 5.

Montenegro in this scenario becomes Northern-Ireland 1969-1998 at best, and Lebanon 1975-1990 at worst. Let’s not forget – if there is one article in abundance in Montenegro, it is firearms.

The whole, above-described scenario is hypothetical, not a certainty and can be avoided. However, the frightening thing is that neither well-meaning people in Montenegrin Government and opposition, nor our Western allies understand how dangerously close we all are to the enactment of this scenario.