The Price of Inaction

For Antena M by: Miljan Vešović

In the last 2-3 weeks, U.S. Secretary of State Blinken visited Albania, while Assistant Secretary of State for Europe&Eurasia James (Jim) O’Brien visited Bosnia and Hercegovina and Montenegro. These visits are as good an excuse as any to try to analyze current trends in American policy towards the Western Balkans.

First of all, a short observation – while Donald J. Trump hasn’t been the President of the United States for the last 3 years, Biden’s administration has continued to utilize some tenets of transactional, “America First” foreign policy championed by the 45th President. One of these principles is – if you want a meeting with highest level officials, or a visit from them, do something useful for the U.S. Albania did two such things – she accepted thousands of Afghan refugees (after the Taliban takeover) and she (in cooperation with U.S. and NATO) facilitated an opening of NATO air base on her soil.

Combined with the fact that Albania has recently concluded her membership in the UN Security Council, it is no wonder that, of all regional countries, Blinken chose Albania for a brief visit. It is also no wonder that Albania and Prime Minister Rama have managed to position themselves as probably the most important U.S. ally in the region.

Secondly, Jim O’Brien’s activity, as well as a relative absence of until recently ubiquitous Deputy Assistant Secretary (and informal special envoy for the Western Balkans) Gabriel Escobar, indicate two things. U.S is paying slightly more attention to the region compared to a year or two ago –O’Brian is a higher level official than Escobar, and, as a highly experienced diplomat (he joined the Department of State in 1989) and one of the authors of Dayton Accords, a very influential voice in U.S. foreign policy circles, especially when Democrats are in power.

Before rejoining the Department of State in 2021, O’Brien had been one of the key alumni of highly influential consulting firm “Allbright Stonebridge Group” – these alumni have basically been running the Department of State since Biden took power. In addition to O’Brien, former (until last summer) Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman, current Under Secretary for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland, current U.S. Permanent Representative to UN Linda Thomas – Greenfield and current Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy and Human Rights Uzra Zeya, among others, are also former alumni of Albright – Stonebridge.

As an Assistant Secretary for Europe&Eurasia, O’Brien’s portfolio is massive – he deals with questions, that, in terms of importance, far outstrip the Western Balkans issues. The fact that he decided to visit Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro in relatively quick succession may indicate not just the more attention being paid to the region, but also more awareness that 2024 might, indeed, be the year of further escalation of currently slow-burning conflicts in the Western Balkans.

Moreover, the (not so) subtlepersonnel shift (when it comes to regional dealings) from Escobar to O’Brien can also indicate that certain policy adjustments are on the cards. It definitely looked like that during O’Brien’s visit to Bosnia and Herzegovina –his vigorous defense of Dayton Accords, sovereignty and unity of Bosnia and Herzegovina and a clear and blunt warning to all (read Milorad Dodik) who want to secede surely sounded differently to Escobar’s musings that “corruption is a bigger problem in Bosnia than nationalism”.

However, in Montenegro, O’Brien’s approach was more “Escobaresque” –focus on economic issues and fight against organized crime combined with aquiet acceptance of further (at ministerial level) inclusion of pro-Russian and pro-Serbian parties in Montenegro’s government (in the past, U.S. officials, including O’Brien and Escobar, publicly cautioned against that).

It was also obvious that O’ Brien delivered a sizable support to current Prime Minister of Montenegro, Spajic, and his government. Spajic managed to present himself as a technocratic politician unburdened with traditional Balkans identity politics and focused on economic issues, unblocking of institutions and EU integration. For better or worse, current State Department’s leadership (including O’Brien) like that approach a lot – they are sick and tired of listening about conflict and problems from the Balkans and they still operate under assumption (many would say – delusion) that rapid economic development will be the key to permanent stability in the region.

High level of support to Prime Minister Spajic in Montenegro, and not so high level of support to other Montenegrin leaders, such as President Milatovic and other political parties of which Spajic’s Cabinet is comprised, may also indicate a subtle shift of U.S. position towards Serbia and its authoritarian President, Aleksandar Vucic. The moves U.S. made in other parts of Western Balkans – O’Brien’s bluntness in Bosnia and Herzegovina and negotiated sale of Javelin Anti-Tank missilesto Kosovo, to name a few, may show that Vucic doesn’t have a de facto carte blanche to do whatever he wants in the region as long as he doesn’t cause conflicts. The carte – blanche approach was, unfortunately, the one (at least publicly and with their inaction) favored by Escobar and US Ambassador to Belgrade (and another alumnus of Albright – Stonebridge Group) Christopher Hill until very recently.

A subtle change can be detected even in the treatment of Kosovo under Prime Minister Kurti, a man far from being U. S’s favorite regional leader. Last year, moves perceived as escalatory by U.S. and EU were met with concrete sanctions towards Kosovo. This time, when the Central Bank of Kosovo, allegedly without proper announcement and prior consultation with international partners, kicked out Serbian Dinar from circulation in the North of Kosovo, thus dismantling money-laundering schemes set up by Vucic’s cronies on the ground, Kurti received a verbal lashing and that was it. And even though the process is slow, the javelins will eventually still be coming to Kosovo Security Forces.

However, these moves to contain Vucic’s influence in the region currently do not extend to Serbia proper. United States are reluctant to immediately throw Vucic under the bus for many reasons. First and foremost, his political strength in Serbia –apart from Belgrade, Serbia is still a Vucic-country, elections – vise. The opposition is weak, divided, and mostly share Vucic’s foreign policy views anyway.

Secondly, the fear of conflict – Vucic, supported, nudged or guided (pick the word you like – they are all true) by Putin, unfortunately has the wherewithal to cause bloodshed in the Balkans and the United States absolutely do not want to find themselves having to solve such a situation. They have enough on their plate. Moreover, the current Congressional impasse about the Security Supplemental might again increase the importance of Serbia as an arms exporter to Ukraine.

All this indicates that Vucic will, in the immediate term, be held in good grace or at least tolerated by the U.S. However, and despite best efforts of Ambassador Hill, the awareness in the U.S, including the State Department, has increasingly been raised about the true nature of Vucic’s regime –its authoritarianism, its corruption, its connections to organized crime and its increasingly open support to Russia, China and Iran.

Vucic, therefore, might be a short-term tactical necessity, but never a long-term strategic partner. He might be patted on the back for the time being, but thrown mercilessly under the bus when he (in political sense, of course) outlives his usefulness. After all, this is exactly what happened with Milosevic – he was patted on the back a lot in 1995, but bombed in 1999, ousted in 2000 and in prison in 2001.

There are some indications that even Ambassador Hill, who is rightfully criticized for being the architect of the appeasement policy towards Serbia, is subtly changing his approach. What he might be doing is still acting as Vucic’s best friend when dealing with Serbian government or the public, but privately letting other Western allies (such as United Kingdom) whip up anti-Vucic sentiment in Serbia and beyond. These assumptions are, for the time being, unsubstantiated and might as well be untrue. However, they do not sound illogical.

Why? Because Vucic’s main problem is that he is an authoritarian leader hellbent on curtailing basic rights and freedoms to his population, and a frontman of the system and policy that has caused unspeakable evils in the Balkans throughout history. To put it simply, he has already gone too far. No one will have a guilty conscience about double-crossing such a politician and no one will lose sleep about (politically) getting rid of him when the time comes.

Nevertheless, even if this optimistic view is taken about the future American approach to Vucic’s regime and, more generally, to the Western Balkans, problems remain. Firstly, whatever the stance on Vucic, the U.S. policymakers still continue to see Serbia firstly as a key country for regional stability, and secondly as a country that can still be nudged to embrace the West. However, as long as the authoritarian system comprised of Serbian Orthodox Church, intelligence services, military, the mafia, nationalist media and intellectuals is in power in Serbia, with or without Vucic, Serbia can only be a source of instability in the region.

Unfortunately, U.S. policymakers have still not accepted that fact. The main reason for their lack of acceptance is “Balkans fatigue” - their unwillingness to play once again the most important role in the region.

Secondly, the time is running out – in Western Balkans, U.S. and their European allies are not the “only kids in the block” anymore. The probability of Vucic’s regime causing conflicts in the region and ratcheting up hybrid warfare against Serbia’s neighbors is rising by the day. It is something that Vucic’s friends from Russia and (to a lesser extent) Iran want – and he can’t afford to say no to them, and doesn’t want to do that anyway.

Last but not least, and as mentioned already, U.S. officials still operate under the assumption that economic development and cooperation will smooth out all the regional differences and bring permanent stability. It is a nice positive story and a breath of fresh air in the Western Balkans. However, it might also be a fairy tale –economic underdevelopment didn’t cause conflicts in the Balkans in the first place and, as shown when Russia attacked Ukraine or by Milosevic in the 90s, authoritarian regimes are often willing to suffer prolonged economic pain when deliberately causing instability in their neighborhood. Vucic is no exception. Moreover, in his case, economic pain might be soothed by favorable loans and investment from Moscow, Beijing and even Tehran.

It might not be too harsh to say that the approach “just focus on economy, make it better, and then cross your fingers that all other problems will go away” is a sign of intellectual and policy-making laziness that stems exactly from the diminished interest in the region.

In Montenegro, it seems that the current Prime Minister shares the same delusion that it is possible to focus only on economy and forget security issues. A week ago, he astonished the public with an amusing statement that he “doesn’t care at all” who the head of Montenegro’s intelligence service would be. Such delusions might as well cost him his political career, and facilitate the definite political victory of pro-Serbian and pro-Russian forces in Montenegro.

Montenegrin pro-European and pro-Western opposition is not exactlyhelpful either. Their failure to adequately (by organizing a big and loud protest) react to yesterday’s humiliation of Montenegro at the hands of Putin’s main ally in the region, Milorad Dodik, shows that pro-Western leaders in Montenegro are, to steal the quote from Garry Kasparov and paraphrase it, like vegans in a steakhouse, frantically wondering why the vegetables are not on the menu.

It is time to call a spade a spade –passivity of Montenegro’s opposition and their failure to proactively and clearly articulate their Euro-Atlantic stance and their proclivity to always “bring a knife to a gunfight” further contribute to deterioration of political and security situation in the country. On the other hand, theircriticism (which they like to lob a lot) of U.S. and EU policies towards Vucic is significantly less potent when they themselves are not ready to stick their necks out and take necessary steps to counter Serbian expansionism and hybrid warfare.

Winston Churchill once said that he never feared action, only inaction. For all the subtleties and nuances described in this article, the approach of U.S. and allies towards the region, as well as the approach of pro-Western forces in Montenegro, is still defined by inaction. Montenegro and the region might pay a very heavy price for that.